About Angela Merkel

"Some are downright damning. "Since the very beginning of this crisis, in 2007-8, Angela Merkel has not ceased providing us with the proof that she is really not the stuff of which great leaders are made," says Jean Quatremer, longstanding Brussels correspondent of the French daily Libération and a veteran observer of European affairs.

"She's navigating by sight, with no real political vision, and no authority. So much sluggishness, so much incapacity to grasp the gravity of the situation, takes the breath away ... Angela Merkel has now become Europe's principal problem."
Others are not quite as scathing, but no less despondent. Merkel's greatest failing, says Charles Grant, of the pro-European thinktank Centre for European Reform, is that she's either unwilling or unable to question prevailing German orthodoxies.

"Truly great political leaders, real statesmen – they can change the weather," Grant says. "They're prepared to think the unthinkable, to say and do things that they know will be deeply unpopular. Merkel just isn't naturally quite brave enough to do a Thatcher, even a Sarkozy, and try to actually change the way people think."

(...)

Grant confesses he has changed his mind on Merkel: "In the beginning, I was a fan. She was brilliant at the early summits; brought everyone together, acted as peacemaker, got deals done. But since the eurozone crisis ... she's pandered to opinion. The very first Greek bailout, back in 2010, was delayed by months because of an election in North Rhine-Westphalia, which the CDU lost anyway."

In Brussels, Quatremer agrees: "She's no doubt a good captain when the weather is calm. But as soon as the seas get rough, she's incapable. I would seriously doubt, for example, whether this chancellor would have been capable of persuading her citizens to accept the euro, as Kohl did in his day, in the face of overwhelmingly hostile public opinion."" [The Guardian]

We miss Helmut Kohl...

"Kosovo and the myth of liberal intervention"

"The Council [of Europe] claims that civilians – Serbian and non-KLA-supporting Kosovan Albanians detained by the KLA in the 1999 hostilities – were shot in northern Albania and their kidneys extracted and sold on the black market. It names Hashim Thaçi, the former leader of the KLA and Kosovo's prime minister, as the boss of a "mafia-like" group engaged in criminal activity – including heroin trading – since before the 1999 war. The report is a damning indictment not only of the KLA but also of western policy. And it also gives lie to the fiction that Nato's war with Yugoslavia was, in Tony Blair's words, "a battle between good and evil; between civilisation and barbarity; between democracy and dictatorship".

It was a fiction many on the liberal left bought into. In 1999 Blair was seen not as a duplicitous warmonger in hock to the US but as an ethical leader taking a stand against ethnic cleansing. But if the west had wanted to act morally in the Balkans and to protect the people in Kosovo there were solutions other than war with the Serbs, and options other than backing the KLA – the most violent group in Kosovan politics. They could have backed genuine multi-party negotiations, or offered to lift sanctions on Belgrade if a peaceful solution to the problem of Kosovo could be found.

Instead, a virulently anti-Serb stance led the west into taking ever more extreme positions, and siding with an organisation which even Robert Gelbard, President Clinton's special envoy to Kosovo, described as "without any question, a terrorist group". In 2000 the Sunday Times revealed that, prior to the Nato bombing, US agents had been training the KLA. Shaban Shala, a KLA commander, claimed he had met British and US agents in north Albania in 1996.

It was the KLA's campaign of violence against Yugoslav state officials, Serbian and Kosovan civilians in 1998, which led to an escalation of the conflict with the government in Belgrade, with atrocities committed on both sides. We were told the outbreak of war in March 1999 with Nato was the Serbian government's fault, yet Lord Gilbert, the UK defence minister, admitted "the terms put to Miloševic at Rambouillet [the international conference preceding the war] were absolutely intolerable … it was quite deliberate".

The subsequent 78-day "humanitarian" bombardment of federal Yugoslavia massively intensified the ethnic cleansing of Kosovan Albanians by Yugoslav forces. Between 2,000 and 10,000 Kosovan Albanians were killed by these forces, with between 500 and 1,500 people killed by the Nato bombing.

But even after Russian pressure forced a Yugoslav withdrawal from Kosovo, ethnic cleansing and rights abuses in the region continued. Under the Nato occupation an estimated 200,000 ethnic Serbs, Roma and other minorities from south Kosovo, and almost the whole Serb population of Pristina, have been forced from their homes.

A report on Kosovo by Minority Rights Group International claimed: "Nowhere [in Europe] is there such a level of fear for so many minorities that they will be harassed or attacked, simply for who they are." And in October 2010, a report by Human Rights Watch stated that "Roma and related minority groups deported from western Europe to Kosovo face discrimination and severe deprivation amounting to human rights abuse". As for democratic advances, Sunday's elections in Kosovo, boycotted by the Serbian minority, have seen widespread allegations of fraud, with a turnout of 149% reported in one area.

Far from being Tony Blair's "good war", Nato's assault on Yugoslavia was in its own way as immoral as the assault on Iraq. But as the Iraq war has become discredited, so it is even more important for the supporters of "liberal interventionism" to promote the line that Kosovo was in some way a success. The Council of Europe's report on the KLA's crimes makes that position much harder to maintain. And if it plays its part in making people more sceptical about any future western "liberal interventions", it is to be warmly welcomed."

"Kosovo and the myth of liberal intervention". Neil Clark. The Guardian. December 15, 2010.

What happened to Madeleine McCann?

Already in February 3, 2008, we wrote about the high probability that the one to blame for Madeleine McCann's death were her own parents, as the portuguese police department believed. In that time they have been wildly attacked by the brittish media, especially the tabloids, while the government kept silent.

Now we know that they shared the "portuguese" opinion that Madeleine's parents should be investigated, thanks (again) to the Wikileaks' cables:

"British police helped to "develop evidence" against Madeleine McCann's parents as they were investigated by Portuguese police as formal suspects in the disappearance of their daughter, the US ambassador to Portugal was told by his British counterpart in September 2007.

(...)

In a diplomatic cable marked confidential, the US ambassador reported: "Without delving into the details of the case, Ellis admitted that the British police had developed the current evidence against the McCann parents, and he stressed that authorities from both countries were working co-operatively."

The comments attributed to the ambassador appear to contradict the widespread perception at the time that Portuguese investigators were the driving force behind the treatment of the McCanns as suspects in the case." [The Guardian]